Art After Philosophy (1969) Joseph Kosuth Essay

The fact that it has recently become fashionable for physicists themselves to be sympathetic toward religion . . . marks the physicists give birth lack of confidence in the validity of their hypotheses, which is a reaction on their p contrivance from the anti ghostly dogmatism of nineteenth-century scientists, and a natural outcome of the crisis by dint of which physics has just passed. A. J. Ayer. . . . once unmatchable has understood the Tractatus there leave behind be no temptation to concern singleself either more than with doctrine, which is neither falsifiable like science nor redundant like mathematics peerless result, like Wittgenstein in 1918, aban fag philosophy, which, as tradition completelyy understood, is rooted in confusion. J. O. Urmson.Traditional philosophy, almost by description, has concerned itself with the un give tongue to. The nearly exclusive focus on the said by twentieth-century uninflectedal lingual philosophers is the sh atomic number 18d co ntention that the unsaid is unsaid beca routine it is unsayable. Hegelian philosophy made scent out in the nineteenth century and must postulate been soothing to a century that was b arly get over Hume, the Enlightenment, and Kant.1 Hegels philosophy was also capable of giving cover for a defense of religious beliefs, supplying an alternative to Newtonian mechanics, and fitting in with the growth of history as a discipline, as come up as accepting Darwinian biology.2 He appe atomic number 18d to give an acceptable resolution to the conflict amid theology and science, as well. The result of Hegels influence has been that a great majority of coeval philosophers are really little more than historiographers of philosophy, Librarians of the Truth, so to speak.One begins to get the impression that there is postcode more to be said. And certain(a)ly if superstar realizes the implications of Wittgensteins thinking, and the thinking influenced by him and after(prenominal) him, C ontinental philosophy look at non seriously be considered here.3 Is there a fence for the unreality of philosophy in our metre? Perhaps this displace be answered by looking into the difference among our time and the centuries former us. In the past mans conclusions around the ground were based on the info he had most it if not specifically like the empiricists, then generally like the rationalists.Often in fact, the closeness between science and philosophy was so great that scientists and philosophers were adept(a) and the same person. In fact, from the times of Thales, Epicurus, Heraclitus, and Aristotle to Desc fines deliberates and Leibnitz, the great label in philosophy were often great names in science as well.4 That the conception as perceived by twentieth-century science is a vastly different one than the one of its preceding century, need not be proved here.Is it possible, then, that in effect man has learned so much, and his comprehension is such(prenomin al), that he cannot believe the reasoning of traditional philosophy? That perhaps he k flats too much almost the world to prove those kinds of conclusions? As Sir James Jeans has stated . . . When philosophy has availed itself of the results of science, it has not been by borrowing the rob mathematical verbal description of the class of planets, only when by borrowing the then current pictorial description of this pattern thus it has not appropriated certain knowledge but conjectures. These conjectures were often good enough for the manly world, but not, as we now know, for those ultimate processes of temperament which control the befallings of the man-sized world, and bring us closest to the true constitution of reality.5He continuesOne consequence of this is that the standard philosophical discussions of m any(prenominal) problems, such as those of causality and free pull up stakes orof materialism or mentalism, are based on an interpretation of the pattern of rasets which is no longer tenable. The scientific basis of these older discussions has been washed away, and with their disappearance oblige gone all the arguments . . .6The twentieth century brought in a time that could be called the end of philosophy and the beginning of stratagem. I do not destine that, of course, strictly speaking, but rather as the tendency of the situation. Certainly linguistic philosophy can be considered the heir to empiricism, but its a philosophy in one gear.7 And there is certainly an machination condition to graphics preceding Duchamp, but its early(a) functions or reasons-to-be are so pronounced that its ability to function clearly as machination limits its stratagem condition so drastically that its unless nominally art.8 In no mechanistic scent out is there a connection between philosophys ending and arts beginning, but I dont find this occurrence entirely coincidental. Though the same reasons may be responsible for both occurrences, the connection is made by me.I bring this all up to analyze arts function and subsequently its viability. And I do so to enable others to understand the reasoning of my and, by extension, other artists art, as well to provide a clearer taste of the term Conceptual art.9 THE FUNCTION OF nontextual division The main qualifications to the lesser position of moving-picture show is that advances in art are certainly not incessantly formal ones. gullald Judd (1963). Half or more of the best juvenile pee in the last fewer years has been neither painting nor sculpture. Donald Judd (1965). E precisething sculpture has, my land doesnt. Donald Judd (1967). The cerebration becomes a machine that makes the art. Sol LeWitt (1965) The one thing to say about art is that it is one thing. Art is art-as-art and e genuinelything else is everything else. Art as art is nothing but art.Art is not what is not art. Ad Reinhardt (1963). The meaning is the use. Wittgenstein. A more utilitarian get d posse ss to the study of concepts has tended to replace the method of introspection. Instead of endeavoring to grasp or describe concepts bare, so to speak, the psychologist investigates the way in which they function as ingredients in beliefs and in judgments. Irving M. Copi. Meaning is always a presupposition of function. T. Segerstedt. . . . the subject matter of abstract investigations is the meaning of certain words and expressions and not the things and states of affairs themselves about which we talk, when using those words and expressions. G. H. Von Wright.Thinking is radically metaphoric. Linkage by analogy is its constituent law or principle, its causal nexus, since meaning only arises by the causal mounts by which a sign stands for (takes the place of) an instance of a sort. To think of anything is to take it as of a sort (as a such and such) and that as brings in (openly or in disguise) the analogy, the parallel, the metaphoric catch it off or ground or grasp or draw by which alone the mind takes hold. It takes no hold if there is nothing for it to haul from, for its thinking is the haul, the attraction of likes I. A. Richards.In this section I ordain discuss the separation between esthetics and art consider briefly formalist art (because it is a confidential information proponent of the idea of aesthetics as art), and assert that art is analogous to an analytic proposition, and that it is arts existence as a tautology that enables art to remain aloof from philosophical presumptions. It is indispensable to scatter aesthetics from art because aesthetics deals with opinions on perception of the world in general. In the past one of the two prongs of arts function was its value as decoration. So any branch of philosophy that dealt with beauty and thus, taste, was inevitably duty bound to discuss art as well. Out of this habit grew the fancy that there was a conceptual connection between art and aesthetics, which is not true.This idea neer drasti cally conflicted with artistic considerations beforehand recent times, not only because the morphological characteristics of art perpetuated the continuity of this error, but as well, because the apparent other functions of art (depiction of religious themes, portraiture of aristocrats, detailing of architecture, etc.) utilise art to cover up art. When aspirations are presented within the context of art (and until recently fair games always have been used) they are as eligible for aesthetic consideration as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration of an object real in the res publica of art means that the objects existence or functioning in an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgment. The relation of aesthetics to art is not unlike that of aesthetics to architecture, in that architecture has a very specific function and how good its design is is primarily associate to how well it performs its function.Thus, judgments on what it looks like cor respond to taste, and we can assure that throughout history different examples of architecture are p increase at different times depending on the aesthetics of occurrence epochs. Aesthetic thinking has flush gone so far as to make examples of architecture not think to art at all, works of art in themselves (e.g., the pyramids of Egypt). Aesthetic considerations are indeed always extraneous to an objects function or reason-tobe. Unless of course, that objects reason-to-be is strictly aesthetic.An example of a rigorously aesthetic object is a decorative object, for decorations primary function is to add something to, so as to make more attractive adorn ornament,10 and this relates right off to taste. And this leads us at once to formalist art and dilettanteism.11 Formalist art (painting and sculpture) is the avant-garde of decoration, and, strictly speaking, one could reasonably assert that its art condition is so minimal that for all functional purposes it is not art at all, but pure exercises in aesthetics. Above all things Clement Greenberg is the critic of taste. Behind every one of his decisions is an aesthetic judgment, with those judgments reflecting his taste. And what does his taste reflect? The period he grew up in as a critic, the period real for him the fifties.12How else can one account for, given his theories if they have any logic to them at all his disinterest in Frank Stella, Ad Reinhardt, and others applicable to his historical lineation? Is it because he is . . . basically unsympathetic on personally experiential grounds?13 Or, in other words, their work doesnt suit his taste? notwithstanding in the philosophic tabula rasa of art, if someone calls it art, as Don Judd has said, its art. Given this, formalist painting and sculpture can be granted an art condition, but only by virtue of their presentation in scathe of their art idea (e.g., a rectangular-shaped canvas stretched over wooden supports and stained with such and such colo rs, using such and such forms, giving such and such a optical experience, etc.). If one looks at contemporary art in this light one realizes the minimal creative effort taken on the part of formalist artists specifically, and all painters and sculptors (working as such today) generally.This brings us to the acknowledgement that formalist art and criticism accepts as a definition of art one that exists solely on morphological grounds. While a vast quantity of similar looking objects or images (or ocularly cerebrate objects or images) may seem to be related (or connected) because of a similarity of ocular/experiential readings, one cannot accept from this an artistic or conceptual relationship. It is obvious then that formalist criticisms reliance on geomorphology leads necessarily with a bias toward the morphology of traditional art. And in this sense their criticism is not related to a scientific method or any sort of empiricism (as Michael Fried, with his detailed description s of paintings and other studious paraphernalia would want us to believe).Formalist criticism is no more than an analysis of the physical attributes of particular objects that happen to exist in a morphological context. just now this doesnt add any knowledge (or facts) to our understanding of the record or function of art. And neither does it comment on whether or not the objects analyzed are even works of art, in that formalist critics always bypass the conceptual element in works of art. on the dot why they dont comment on the conceptual element in works of art is precisely because formalist art is only art by virtue of its resemblance to earlier works of art. Its a mindless art. Or, as Lucy Lippard so succinctly described Jules Olitskis paintings theyre visual Muzak.14 Formalist critics and artists alike do not question the nature of art, but as I have said elsewhere Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is quizzical the nature of painting, one cann ot be questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. Thats because the word art is general and the word painting is specific. Painting is a kind of art. If you make paintings you are already accepting (not questioning) the nature of art. One is then accepting the nature of art to be the European tradition of a painting-sculpture dichotomy.15The strongest objection one can raise against a morphological justification for traditional art is that morphological notions of art embody an implied a priori concept of arts possibilities. And such an a priori concept of the nature of art (as separate from analytically framed art propositions or work, which I will discuss later) makes it, indeed, a priori impossible to question the nature of art. And this questioning of the nature of art is a very weighty concept in understanding the function of art.The function of art, as a question, was first raised by Marcel Ducha mp. In fact it is Marcel Duchamp whom we can credit with giving art its own identity. (One can certainly see a tendency toward this self-identification of art beginning with Manet and Czanne through to Cubism,16 but their works are timid and ambiguous by comparison with Duchamps.) Modern art and the work before seemed connected by virtue of their morphology. Another way of putting it would be that arts address remained the same, but it was verbal expression new things. The event that made conceivable the realization that it was possible to speak some other phrase and still make sense in art was Marcel Duchamps first unbacked Ready-made. With the unassisted Ready-made, art changed its focus from the form of the wrangle to what was being said. Which means that it changed the nature of art from a question of morphology to a question of function.This change one from appearance to conception was the beginning of novel art and the beginning of conceptual art. All art (after Ducha mp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually. The value of particular artists after Duchamp can be weighed according to how much they questioned the nature of art which is another way of verbalise what they added to the conception of art or what wasnt there before they started. Artists question the nature of art by presenting new propositions as to arts nature. And to do this one cannot concern oneself with the handed-down voice communication of traditional art, as this activity is based on the assumption that there is only one way of flesh art propositions. But the very stuff of art is indeed greatly related to creating new propositions.The contingency is often made particularly in reference to Duchamp that objects of art (such as the Ready-mades, of course, but all art is implied in this) are judged as objets dart in later years and the artists intentions become irrelevant. such an argument is the case of a preconceived notion ordering together not nec essarily related facts. The point is this aesthetics, as we have pointed out, are conceptually irrelevant to art. Thus, any physical thing can become objet dart, that is to say, can be considered tasteful, aesthetically pleasing, etc. But this has no bearing on the objects application to an art context that is, its functioning in an art context. (E.g., if a collector takes a painting, attaches legs, and uses it as a dining table its an act unrelated to art or the artist because, as art, that wasnt the artists intention.) And what holds true for Duchamps work applies as well to most of the art after him. In other words, the value of Cubism for instance is its idea in the realm of art, not the physical or visual qualities seen in a specific painting, or the particularization of certain colors or shapes.For these colors and shapes are the arts language, not its meaning conceptually as art. To look upon a Cubist masterwork now as art is nonsensical, conceptually speaking, as far as ar t is concerned. (That visual information that was laughable in Cubisms language has now been generally indifferent and has a lot to do with the way in which one deals with painting linguistically. E.g., what a Cubist painting meant experimentally and conceptually to, say, Gertrude Stein, is beyond our speculation because the same painting then meant something different than it does now.) The value now of an original Cubist painting is not unlike, in most respects, an original manuscript by original Byron, or The Spirit of St. Louis as it is seen in the Smithsonian basis. (Indeed, museums fill the very same function as the Smithsonian Institution why else would the Jeu de Paume wing of the Louvre exhibitCzannes and Van Goghs palettes as proudly as they do their paintings?) Actual works of art are little more than historical curiosities. As far as art is concerned Van Goghs paintings arent value any more than his palette is. They are both collectors items.17 Art lives through in fluencing other art, not by vivacious as the physical residue of an artists ideas. The reason that different artists from the past are brought alive again is because some aspect of their work becomes usable by living artists. That there is no truth as to what art is seems quite unrealized. What is the function of art, or the nature of art? If we continue our analogy of the forms art takes as being arts language one can realize then that a work of art is a kind of proposition presented within the context of art as a comment on art. We can then go besides and analyze the types of propositions.A. J. Ayers evaluation of Kants distinction between analytic and synthetic is useful to us here A proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is placed by the facts of experience.18 The analogy I will test to make is one between the art condition and the condition of the analytic proposition. In that t hey dont appear to be believable as anything else, or be about anything (other than art) the forms of art most clearly finally referable only to art have been forms closest to analytical propositions. Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, if viewed within their context as art they provide no information whatsoever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artists intention, that is, he is saying that that particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art.Thus, that it is art is true a priori (which is what Judd means when he states that if someone calls it art, its art). Indeed, it is nearly impossible to discuss art in general terms without talking in tautologies for to attempt to grasp art by any other handle is only when to focus on another aspect or property of the proposition, which is usually irrelevant to the artworks art condition. One begins to realize that arts art condition is a conceptual s tate. That the language forms that the artist frames his propositions in are often private codes or languages is an inevitable outcome of arts freedom from morphological constrictions and it follows from this that one has to be familiar with contemporary art to appreciate it and understand it. too one understands why the man in the street is intolerant to artistic art and always demands art in a traditional language. (And one understands why formalist art sells like hot cakes.)Only in painting and sculpture did the artists all speak the same language. What is called Novelty Art by the formalists is often the attempt to find new languages, although a new language doesnt necessarily mean the framing of new propositions e.g., most kinetic and electronic art. Another way of stating, in relation to art, what Ayer asserted about the analytic method in the context of language would be the pursual The validity of artistic propositions is not underage on any confirmable, much less any ae sthetic, presupposition about the nature of things. For the artist, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way (1) in which art is capable of conceptual growth and (2) how his propositions are capable of logically following that growth.19 In other words, the propositions of art are not f existent, but linguistic in character that is, they do not describe the behavior of physical, or even mental objects they express definitions of art, or the formal consequences of definitions of art.Accordingly, we can say that art operates on a logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical inquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions (of art) and not with questions of falsifiable fact.20 To repeat, what art has in common with logic and mathematics is that it is a tautology i.e., the art idea (or work) and art are the same and can be appreciated as art without going removed the context of art for verification.On the other hand, let us consider why art cannot be (or has difficulty when it attempts to be) a synthetic proposition. Or, that is to say, when the truth or falsity of its assertion is verifiable on empirical grounds. Ayer states . . . The criterion by which we determine the validity of an a priori or analytical proposition is not able to determine the validity of an empirical or synthetic proposition. For it is characteristic of empirical propositions that their validity is not purely formal. To say that a geometrical proposition, or a system of geometrical propositions, is false, is to say that it is self-contradictory. But an empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions, may be free from contradiction and still be false. It is said to be false, not because it is formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion.21The unreality of pragmatic art is due to its framing as an art proposition in synthetic terms one is always tempted to verify the proposition empirically. Realisms synthetic state does not bring one to a circular swing back into a dialogue with the larger framework of questions about the nature of art (as does the work of Malevich, Mondrian, Pollock, Reinhardt, early Rauschenberg, Johns, Lichtenstein, Warhol, Andre, Judd, Flavin, LeWitt, Morris, and others), but rather, one is flung out of arts orbit into the absolute space of the human condition. Pure Expressionism, continuing with Ayers terms, could be considered as such A denounce which consisted of demonstrative symbols would not express a genuine proposition. It would be a mere ejaculation, in no way characterizing that to which it was supposed to refer.Expressionist works are usually such ejaculations presented in the morphological language of traditional art. If Pollock is important it is because he painted on loose canvas horizontally to the floor. What isnt important is that he later put those dri ppings over stretchers and hung them parallel to the wall. (In other words what is important in art is what one brings to it, not ones adoption of what was previously existing.) What is even less important to art is Pollocks notions of self-expression because those kinds of subjective meanings are useless to anyone other than those involved with him personally. And their specific quality puts them right(prenominal) of arts context. I do not make art, Richard Serra says, I am employed in an activity if someone wants to call it art, thats his business, but its not up to me to resolve that. Thats all figured out later. Serra, then, is very much aware of the implications of his work.If Serra is indeed just reckon out what lead does (gravitationally, molecularly, etc.), why should anyone think of it as art? If he doesnt take the obligation of it being art, who can, or should? His work certainly appears to be empirically verifiable lead can do, and be used for, many physical activiti es. In itself this does anything but lead us into a dialogue about the nature of art. In a sense then he is a primitive. He has no idea about art. How is it then that we know about his activity?Because he has told us it is art by his actions after his activity has taken place. That is, by the fact that he is with several galleries, puts the physical residue of his activity in museums (and sells them to art collectors but as we have pointed out, collectors are irrelevant to the condition of art of a work). That he denies his work is art but plays the artist is more than just a paradox. Serra secretly feels that arthood is arrived at empirically. Thus, as Ayer has stated There are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is only tautologies that are certain. a posteriori questions are one and all hypotheses, which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense experience. And the propositions in which we record the observations that verify these hypotheses are themselves hy potheses which are subject to the test of further sense experience. Thus there is no final proposition.22What one finds all throughout the writings of Ad Reinhardt is this very similar thesis of artas-art, and that art is always dead, and a living art is a deception.23 Reinhardt had a very clear idea about the nature of art, and his importance is far from recognized. Because forms of art that can be considered synthetic propositions are verifiable by the world, that is to say, to understand these propositions one must leave the tautological-like framework of art and consider outside information. But to consider it as art it is necessary to ignore this same outside information, because outside information (experiential qualities, to note) has its own intrinsic worth. And to comprehend this worth one does not need a state of art condition.From this it is easy to realize that arts viability is not connected to the presentation of visual (or other) kinds of experience. That that may hav e been one of arts extraneous functions in the preceding centuries is not unlikely. after all, man in even the nineteenth century lived in a fairly standardized visual environment. That is, it was ordinarily predictable as to what he would be coming into contact with day after day. His visual environment in the part of the world in which he lived was fairly consistent. In our time we have an experientially drastically richer environment. One can fly all over the earth in a matter of hours and days, not months. We have the cinema, and color television, as well as the man-made spectacle of the lights of Las Vegas or the skyscrapers of New York City.The all told world is there to be seen, and the whole world can watch man walk on the moon from their living rooms. Certainly art or objects of painting and sculpture cannot be expected to contest experientially with this? The notion of use is relevant to art and its language. Recently the package or block form has been used a great dea l within the context of art. (Take for instance its use by Judd, Morris, LeWitt, Bladen, Smith, Bell, and McCracken not even mentioning the quantity of boxes and cubes that came after.) The difference between all the mixed uses of the box or cube form is directly related to the differences in the intentions of the artists. Further, as is particularly seen in Judds work, the use of the box or cube form illustrates very well our earlier claim that an object is only art when placed in the context of art.A few examples will point this out. One could say that if one of Judds box forms was seen filled with debris, seen placed in an industrial setting, or even merely seen sitting on a street corner, it would not be identified with art. It follows then that understanding and consideration of it as an artwork is necessary a priori to viewing it in order to see it as a work of art. Advance information about the concept of art and about an artists concepts is necessary to the appreciation and understanding of contemporary art. Any and all of the physical attributes (qualities) of contemporary works, if considered separately and/or specifically, are irrelevant to the art concept. The art concept (as Judd said, though he didnt mean it this way) must be considered in its whole. To consider a concepts parts is invariably to consider aspects that are irrelevant to its art condition or like reading parts of a definition.It comes as no surprise that the art with the least indomitable morphology is the example from which we decipher the nature of the general term art. For where there is a context existing separately of its morphology and consisting of its function one is more likely to find results less conforming and predictable. It is in modern arts possession of a language with the shortest history that the plausibility of the abandonment of that language becomes most possible. It is understandable then that the art that came out of Western painting and sculpture is the mo st energetic, questioning (of its nature), and the least assuming of all the general art concerns. In the final analysis, however, all of the arts have but (in Wittgensteins terms) a family resemblance. Yet the various qualities relatable to an art condition possessed by poem, the novel, the cinema, the theatre, and various forms of music, etc., is that aspect of them most reliable to the function of art as asserted here.Is not the decline of poetry relatable to the implied metaphysics from poetrys use of common language as an art language?24 In New York the last decadent stages of poetry can be seen in the move by cover poets recently toward the use of actual objects and theatre.25 Can it be that they feel the unreality of their art form? We see now that the axioms of a geometry are simply definitions, and that the theorems of a geometry are simply the logical consequences of these definitions. A geometry is not in itself about physical space in itself it cannot be said to be abo ut anything. But we can use a geometry to reason about physical space.That is to say, once we have given the axioms a physical interpretation, we can proceed to apply the theorems to the objects which satisfy the axioms. Whether a geometry can be applied to the actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which falls outside the scope of geometry itself. There is no sense, therefore, in asking which of the various geometries known to us are false and which are true. Insofar as they are all free from contradiction, they are all true. The proposition which states that a certain application of a geometry is possible is not itself a proposition of that geometry. All that the geometry itself tells us is that if anything can be brought under the definitions, it will also satisfy the theorems. It is therefore a purely logical system, and its propositions are purely analytic propositions. A. J. Ayer26hither then I propose rests the viability of art. In an age when traditional phil osophy is unreal because of its assumptions, arts ability to exist will depend not only on its not performing a service as entertainment, visual (or other) experience, or decoration which is something easily replaced by kitsch culture, and technology, but, rather, it will remain possible by not assuming a philosophical stance for in arts unique character is the capacity to remain alooffrom philosophical judgments. It is in this context that art shares similarities with logic, mathematics, and, as well, science. But whereas the other endeavors are useful, art is not. Art indeed exists for its own sake. In this period of man, after philosophy and religion, art may possibly be one endeavor that fulfills what another age might have called mans spiritual needs. Or, another way of putting it might be that art deals analogously with the state of things beyond physics where philosophy had to make assertions. And arts strength is that even the preceding sentence is an assertion, and canno t be verified by art. Arts only claim is for art. Art is the definition of art.NOTES * Reprinted from Studio International (October, 1969). 1 Morton White, The Age of Analysis (New York Mentor Books), p. 14. 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 I mean by this Existentialism and Phenomenology. Even Merleau-Ponty, with his middle-of-the-road position between empiricism and rationalism, cannot express his philosophy without the use of words (thus using concepts) and following this, how can one discuss experience without sharp distinctions between ourselves and the world? 4 Sir James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy (Ann Arbor, Mich. University of Michigan Press), p. 17. 5 Ibid., p. 190. 6 Ibid., p. 190. 7 The task such philosophy has taken upon itself is the only function it could perform without making philosophic assertions. 8 This is dealt with in the following section. 9 I would like to make it clear, however, that I intend to speak for no one else. I arrived at these conclusions alone, and indeed, it i s from this thinking that my art since 1966 (if not before) evolved.Only recently did I realize after run across Terry Atkinson that he and Michael Baldwin share similar, though certainly not identical, opinions to mine. 10 Websters New conception Dictionary of the American Language. 11 The conceptual level of the work of Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Morris Louis, Ron Davis, Anthony Caro, John Hoyland, Dan Christensen, et al., is so dismally low, that any that is there is supplied by the critics promoting it. This is seen later. 12 Michael Frieds reasons for using Greenbergs rationale reflect his stage setting (and most of the other formalist critics) as a scholar, but more of it is due to his desire, I suspect, to bring his critical studies into the modern world. One can easily sympathize with his desire to connect, say, Tiepolo with Jules Olitski. One should never forget, however, that a historian loves history more than anything, even art.13 Lucy Lippard uses this quotation in a footnote to Ad Reinhardts retroactive catalogue, January, 1967, p. 28. 14 Lucy Lippard, Constellation by Harsh Daylight The Whitney Annual, Hudson Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1968). 15 Arthur R. Rose, quaternity Interviews, Arts Magazine (February, 1969). 16 As Terry Atkinson pointed out in his introduction to Art-Language (Vol. 1, No. 1), the Cubists never questioned if art had morphological characteristics, but which ones in painting were acceptable. 17 When someone buys a Flavin he isnt buying a light show, for if he was he could just go to a hardware computer storage and get the goods for considerably less. He isnt buying anything. He is subsidizing Flavins activity as an artist. 18 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York Dover Publications), p. 78. 19 Ibid., p. 57.20 Ibid., p. 57. 21 Ibid., p.90. 22 Ibid., p. 94. 23 Ad Reinhardts retrospective catalogue (Jewish Museum, January, 1967) written by Lucy Lippard, p. 12. 24 It is poetrys use of common language t o attempt to say the unsayable that is problematic, not any inherent problem in the use of language within the context of art. 25 Ironically, many of them call themselves Conceptual Poets. Much of this work is very similar to Walter de Marias work and this is not coincidental de Marias work functions as a kind of object poetry, and his intentions are very poetic he really wants his work to change mens lives. 26 Op. cit., p. 82.